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RIGHT TO BE COUNSELED: THE EFFECT OF COLLATERAL 
CONSEQUENCES ON THE STRICKLAND STANDARD 
Paul Quincy* 
INTRODUCTION 
If life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are the pinnacle of the Amer-
ican Dream, then the ability to defend oneself from wrongful conviction and 
incarceration is a vital component to protecting the dream.  The Sixth 
Amendment’s promise of the right to counsel in criminal defense is essential 
to protecting Americans’ liberties.  But increasingly, the Sixth Amendment 
is necessary as an instrument of protection from non-incarcerative punish-
ments—the ever-broadening world of collateral consequences. 
“Collateral consequence” refers to any of the thousands of rights that can 
be revoked alongside a criminal conviction1—from eligibility for elected office 
in Alabama2 to the ability to form a nonprofit cooperative agriculture or live-
stock association in Wyoming.3  Specific defendants can face varied levels of 
punishment based on the charges they face—an immigrant may face jail time 
followed by automatic deportation while a citizen faces only jail time for the 
same crime.4  The essential definition of collateral versus direct consequences 
stems from the source of the punishment—whether civil or penal enforcement.5 
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 1 A recent survey, the National Inventory of Collateral Consequences of Conviction, estimates nearly 
fifty thousand statutory collateral consequences throughout the United States’ federal and state 
systems.  See Search, JUST. CTR., https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org/search/ (last visited Dec. 31, 
2017) (indicating that the project has compiled 48,229 collateral state and federal law collateral 
consequences in its database); see also Project Description, JUST. CTR., https://niccc.csgjustice-
center.org/description/ (last visited Dec. 31, 2017) (describing the National Inventory of Collateral 
Consequences of Conviction). 
 2 ALA. CODE § 17-17-41 (West 2017) (declaring a candidate ineligible following a conviction of brib-
ery or wrongfully attempting to influence a voter). 
 3 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-10-103 (West 2017). 
 4 8 C.F.R. § 214.1(g) (2017). 
 5 Collateral consequences take effect through civil enforcement, not as a direct criminal punishment.  
Deportation, therefore, is a collateral consequence.  See INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE 
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 15–16 (Mark Mauer & Meda Chesney-
Lind eds., 2002) [hereinafter INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT] (identifying collateral consequences as a 
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Following the Supreme Court’s recognition that the Sixth Amendment 
includes the right to effective counsel in Strickland v. Washington,6 the Court has 
produced a long line of opinions defining the constitutional standard for ade-
quate representations for criminal defendants.7  In producing these opinions, 
the Court seems to have acknowledged a pragmatic—and perhaps moralist—
reality that the requirements of effective counsel are directly proportional to 
the extent of the crime’s punishment.  While the Court has in-depth discussion 
regarding the requirements of counsel for death penalty defendants, it has 
largely left counsel for misdemeanants without any effective standards. 
With the proliferation of collateral consequences, the effective level of harm 
from a misdemeanor conviction can steeply rise based on the defendant’s cir-
cumstances.  By factoring in these collateral harms, the Strickland requirement 
of effective counsel demands a higher level of interaction between client and 
attorney.  While the Court has not articulated tangible standards for effective 
counsel in light of collateral punishment mechanisms, the implications of col-
lateral consequences likely necessitate that—at a minimum—effective attorneys 
communicate with their clients about both the possible collateral harms of a 
guilty plea and the client’s concerns regarding non-incarcerative punishments. 
I.  THE SLIDING SCALE OF THE STRICKLAND STANDARD 
The origins of the right to counsel demonstrate the effect of the level of 
crime on the required amount of representation by a defense attorney.  The 
earliest recognition of a right to a defense attorney came from the most dire 
circumstances—stranded, illiterate black men sentenced for group rape in a 
racially-charged and mob-threatened courtroom within only days of indict-
ment.8  Slowly the recognition of the right to counsel spread outward from 
there, beginning with felonies before protecting misdemeanants.  As it stands, 
all criminal defendants within the United States that face incarceration for a 
criminal offense have a right to counsel, regardless of the level of crime.9 
The right to counsel, of course, means more than just having a licensed 
attorney stand by the defendant when physically in court.  The Supreme 
Court recognized a functional requirement of the Sixth Amendment in Strick-
	
type of “punishment” even though they are defined as “civil” rather than criminal). 
 6 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
 7 See infra Part II.A. 
 8 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 51 (1932). 
 9 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (holding that “absent a knowing and intelligent 
waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or 
felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 
342 (1963) (holding that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of counsel applies to state as well as 
federal proceedings). 
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land v. Washington, holding that the Sixth Amendment demands that all crim-
inal defendants have “reasonably effective assistance” from their attorneys.10  
Gideon’s and Strickland’s progeny establish the requirements of reasonable 
counsel as a sort of sliding scale—with more severe punishments meriting 
more significant time and effort from criminal defense attorneys.11 
A review of the origins of the right to counsel and the different encom-
passed duties provides a useful context for why the right to effective counsel 
is directly related to the level of criminality.  The Supreme Court’s reliance 
on professional norms and on pragmatic impacts of a reasonableness stand-
ard further cement the real-world application of the Strickland sliding scale.  
Furthermore, this model suggests that consideration of collateral conse-
quences may blur or abolish the distinction between required services for 
misdemeanor and felony defenses. 
A.  The Origins of the Right to Counsel 
The right to counsel was, itself, born out of the Court’s dealings with cap-
ital crimes and death penalty cases.  In Powell v. Alabama, the Court recog-
nized that the deplorable conditions under which the “Scottsboro boys” 
faced trial constituted a violation of the Sixth Amendment.12  The Scottsboro 
boys were nine young black men charged with rape of two white women, 
while traveling through Scottsboro, Alabama.13  The Powell Court ruled nar-
rowly in light of the egregious circumstances and partially applied the right 
to counsel to state courts when the courts sees something as exceptional as a 
“dumb, illiterate, and feeble-minded” defendant, sentenced to death, that 
cannot afford counsel.14 
The Court followed this line of protection in Betts v. Brady in 1942, which 
affirmed that state courts must appoint counsel for indigent defendants, but 
only when the defendant is “incapable adequately of making his own defense 
because of ignorance, feeblemindedness, illiteracy, or the like.”15  Again, the 
Court limited its opinion to the most offensive of circumstances—facing a 
capital sentence without the protection of counsel.  Although the Court 
would later expand the protections of Powell and Betts to the point of near-
	
 10 466 U.S. at 687. 
 11  See infra notes 12–16. 
 12 Powell, 287 U.S. at 59. 
 13 Id. at 51; id. at 74 (Butler, J., dissenting) (“[N]ine defendants . . . were accused . . . .”). 
 14 Id. at 72.  The Court did not wholly incorporate the Sixth Amendment to state courts for decades 
to come.  See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (guaranteeing the right to trial in 
state courts for non-petty crimes); Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 364 (1966) (noting that the 
“Sixth Amendment [is] made applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment”). 
 15 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 463–64 (1942). 
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redundancy, the origins of the nationwide right to counsel nonetheless 
demonstrate the Court’s high premium on protections of counsel when a de-
fendant faces a more exacting punishment for the crime.16 
The right to counsel truly came of age with Gideon v. Wainwright, when the 
Court affirmed the Sixth Amendment’s reach into both state and federal 
court systems and expanded the right to counsel to noncapital crimes.17  In 
Gideon, the Court rejected its previous standard from Betts and read the Sixth 
Amendment to protect the right to counsel for all criminal defendants, re-
gardless of severity of the crime or the defendant’s level of education.18  In 
the unanimous opinion of the Court, Justice Black wrote that “certain fun-
damental rights” from the Bill of Rights apply equally to state and federal 
protections through the Fourteenth Amendment, “among them the funda-
mental right of the accused to the aid of counsel in a criminal prosecution.”19  
Justice Black’s opinion managed to make no reference to any distinction be-
tween felonies, misdemeanors, or capital crimes in its holding.20  As a result, 
the right to counsel outlined in Gideon expanded from Powell and Betts by in-
cluding protection in all criminal proceedings, regardless of the level of pun-
ishment or whether charged in a federal or state court.21 
B.  Effective Counsel—Strickland and the Modern Sixth Amendment 
The Gideon Court declined to answer whether the Sixth Amendment pro-
tects only the formalist right of a defendant to have an attorney’s nominal 
availability or if there was a meaningful standard to what representation had 
to entail for someone facing criminal conviction.  In Strickland, the Court de-
cided on the latter standard, holding that the Sixth Amendment provided for 
	
 16 Cf. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 159–60 (holding that the right to trial by jury in a state court applies to all 
non-petty crimes but refusing to mandate the protection for lesser crimes). 
 17 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963).  The right to counsel for criminal defendants 
already existed in the federal court system for decades.  Johnston v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), 
recognized this protection only six years after Powell and four years before Betts.  See id. at  463 (“The 
Sixth Amendment withholds from federal courts, in all criminal proceedings, the power and au-
thority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty unless he has or waives the assistance of counsel.”  
(footnote omitted)). 
 18 See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342–44 (rejecting the logic of Betts in favor of broader Sixth Amendment 
protection). 
 19 Id. at 343 (quoting Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243–44 (1936)). 
 20 Black’s only mentions of “felony” or “misdemeanor” come from his summary of the case’s facts and 
reference to Betts.  See id. at 336–37, 339.  The opinion does not mention “capital crimes,” and that 
term is used only once in Justice Clark’s opinion concurring in the result, referring to Betts.  See id. at 
348 (Clark, J., concurring in the result).  None of these terms are mentioned in Black’s reasoning. 
 21 See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 32 (1972) (“Both Powell and Gideon involved felonies.  But 
their rationale has relevance to any criminal trial, where an accused is deprived of his liberty.  Powell 
and Gideon suggest that there are certain fundamental rights applicable to all such criminal 
prosecutions . . . .”). 
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more than just an attorney’s presence, but also some degree of effective repre-
sentation—asking “whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper 
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as hav-
ing produced a just result.”22  To make a successful Strickland claim, therefore, 
a convicted claimant must show both (1) unreasonably ineffective representa-
tion by counsel and (2) that counsel’s incompetency prejudiced the court 
against the claimant.23  While recognizing that the Sixth Amendment guar-
antees meaningful representation, Justice O’Connor’s opinion left the true 
standard of the right to effective counsel vague, continuing the Fifth Circuit’s 
reliance on “reasonably effective assistance” under the “totality of the circum-
stances.”24  Despite her reference to attorney performance balanced against 
“prevailing professional norms,”25 the Strickland Court continued to give large 
amounts of deference to attorneys’ decisions, including those of failing to in-
vestigate significant information, as within their strategic discretion.26 
C.  “Reasonably Effective Assistance”—Strickland’s Sliding Scale 
The modern implications of Strickland, as they apply to non-felony represen-
tation, rely on a substantial amount of speculation without definitive guidance 
by the Supreme Court.  Without reservation, the Court has confirmed that the 
right to effective counsel and the logic of Strickland apply to any criminal defense 
case where there is a risk of criminal incarceration: “Both Powell and Gideon in-
volved felonies.  But their rationale has relevance to any criminal trial, where 
an accused is deprived of his liberty.”27  In unambiguous language in Argersinger, 
Justice Douglas described access to effective counsel as a constitutional prereq-
uisite before incarceration: “[N]o imprisonment may be imposed, even though 
local law permits it, unless the accused is represented by counsel.”28 
The Court’s determination that the right to counsel applies to all incar-
cerative charges is grounded in pragmatic concerns—that an individual can 
lose his or her liberty as a result of the complications of the legal system—
rather than formalism regarding the conviction.  For example, in Alabama v. 
Shelton, the Court affirmed the Alabama court’s determination that the right 
to counsel applies even in the case of suspended sentencing, when the incar-
ceration is “not immediate or inevitable.”29 
	
 22 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (“[T]he right to counsel is the right to the 
effective assistance of counsel.”  (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970))). 
 23 Id. at 687. 
 24 Id. at 680 (quoting Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243, 1250 (5th Cir. 1982)). 
 25 Id. at 688. 
 26 Id. at 691. 
 27 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 32 (1972). 
 28 Id. at 40. 
 29 Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 659, 674 (2002). 
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The Court’s continued reliance on pragmatic concerns, a reasonableness 
standard, prevailing professional norms, and totality of circumstances in the 
Strickland analysis suggests that Strickland’s standards vary based on the possi-
ble extent of punishment for the defendant.  Accordingly, a defense attorney 
must meet the most demanding levels of representation for a client facing 
capital punishment, but the bar of “reasonably effective counsel” is much 
lower for minor sentences.30 
Although the right to counsel attaches to capital, felony, and misde-
meanor cases, the Court has taken significantly more opportunities to ad-
dress the right to effective counsel in capital cases, with fewer cases addressing 
felonies and almost never speaking to requirements in misdemeanor defense.  
Based on its history, the Court has implicitly demonstrated that the most sig-
nificant Strickland violations occur in capital crimes, where Strickland’s require-
ments are highest, but the sliding scale of “reasonably effective counsel” cre-
ates a lesser bar in lower risk crimes like misdemeanors. 
1.  Death Penalty Defense 
The highest threshold for criminal defense attorneys occurs in counsel’s 
representation of clients facing the death penalty.  Even before the Court firmly 
established the right to counsel in Gideon, the right to counsel was borne out of 
Powell, a capital case.31  The Powell Court required adequate representation for 
the Scottsboro boys, which included the attorney’s ability to investigate cir-
cumstances around the client’s arrest and time to prepare an adequate de-
fense.32  Several other previously mentioned foundational Sixth Amendment 
cases, including Strickland, likewise pushed forward the protections from inade-
quate or nonexistent defense representation in death penalty cases.33 
The Court upheld the need to perform some threshold of investigation for 
death penalty defendants with Wiggins v. Smith34 and Rompilla v. Beard.35  In 
Wiggins, the Court restated its reasonableness standard to the requirements of 
investigation,36 and it relied on specified professional requirements of effective 
	
 30 While the Court has never expressly accepted that Strickland’s reasonableness standard is actually a 
variable formula, a combination of reliance on variable professional norms, pragmatic concessions, 
and trends in the Court’s analysis demonstrate a real-world application of a variable formula. 
 31 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 50, 73 (1932). 
 32 Id. at 58. 
 33 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) (recounting defense counsel’s arguments at 
death penalty sentencing hearing); see also, e.g., Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 40; Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 
U.S. 145, 159–60 (1968). 
 34 Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003). 
 35 Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 383 (2005). 
 36 Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521 (“[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a 
reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.”  (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 690–91)). 
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representation in capital defense cases.37  Therefore, capital defense investi-
gation requires, as a constitutional minimum, investigation into mitigation 
factors in the defendant’s past, including “medical history, educational his-
tory, employment and training history, family and social history, prior adult 
and juvenile correctional experience, and religious and cultural influences.”38 
Likewise, in Rompilla, the Court reiterated the high bar of investigation 
required for capital defense.  A jury convicted Rompilla of a violent murder, 
in which the victim was “stabbed repeatedly and set on fire.”39  The attorney 
in Rompilla “failed to investigate ‘pretty obvious signs’” of childhood trauma, 
mental illness, and alcoholism or even to search the publicly available files 
that the prosecution declared they would rely on.40  Rompilla expanded Wig-
gins’s holding, requiring tangible efforts by criminal defense attorneys to in-
vestigate the defendant’s past and criminal record when defending the justice 
system’s most punitive cases.41 
By recognizing these finite standards, the Court defined specific needs for 
death penalty defense attorneys to meet in any capital defense case, including 
sentencing hearings.  While the Court rarely proclaims tangible require-
ments of effective counsel, Wiggins and Rompilla offer examples of a Court 
facing the possibility of underrepresentation in death penalty sentencing.  
Given the high stakes and high levels of punishment, the Court therefore was 
less reluctant to demand attorney actions than to allow condemning findings 
to stand.  By recognizing these tangible requirements, the Court also implic-
itly noted that the right to counsel demands the highest levels of representa-
tion in capital defense cases. 
2.  Felony Defense 
The right to effective counsel, of course, extends beyond death penalty sen-
tencing.  Gideon itself was a felony case.42  However, the Court has not opted to 
put the same hard lines onto felony defense that Rompilla and Wiggins evinced, 
	
 37 Id. at 524 (citing GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN 
DEATH PENALTY CASES 11.4.1(C) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1989)). 
 38 Id. (emphasis omitted) (citing GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF 
COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES 11.8.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1989)). 
 39 Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 377. 
 40 Id. at 379. 
 41 Id. at 390.  Although Rompilla still represents good law, it holds a peculiar position as one of the 
closest cases in the Court’s history—Justice O’Connor wrote the opinion in Rompilla, and within 
one year she had resigned from the Court and been replaced by Justice Alito, the writer of the 
Third Circuit opinion that Rompilla overturned.  See Rompilla v. Horn, 355 F.3d 233, 235 (3d Cir. 
2004); David Stout, Alito Resists Making Comparisons to O’Connor, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/12/politics/politicsspecial1/alito-resists-making-compari-
sons-to-oconnor.html. 
 42 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 336–37 (1963). 
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suggesting that the “reasonably effective” advocacy is a lower standard when the 
death sentence is not on the line.  Interestingly, the Supreme Court’s felony cases 
require forms of representation that extend beyond mere advocacy in trial.43 
While the “objective standard of reasonableness” still applies in felony 
defense cases,44 the Court has not held the same level of requirement as in 
capital defense cases.  Instead, the Court has deferred to the prevailing norms 
of the legal profession, as measured by professional organizations like the 
American Bar Association.45 
Appellate courts have proliferated some finite requirements of the duty 
to investigate in non-capital felony cases.  The Fourth Circuit, in United States 
v. Mooney, held that there was a Sixth Amendment violation when an attorney 
failed to investigate a viable affirmative defense to the client’s felony charge 
of unlawful possession of a firearm.46  The Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of the 
convicted felon when his attorney advised him to reject a plea deal for five 
years’ incarceration47—advice which the court called “not only erroneous, 
but egregious,” by failing to recognize that the defendant was subject to the 
“three strikes law” and therefore eligible for a life sentence.48 
The courts’ rulings in felony defense cases demonstrate continuing pro-
tections as a part of the reasonable performance of attorneys in felony defense 
cases, as proportional to the level of punishment sought by the prosecution.  
The reality that the Court does not go to the same efforts to protect alleged 
felons from ineffective representation as in capital defense cases shows that 
the Court is less willing to consider the obligations of felony defense as a high 
constitutional threshold. 
3.  Misdemeanor Defense 
While the right to counsel does extend to misdemeanor charges, there is little 
definitive case law to define the scope of the Sixth Amendment’s substantive re-
quirements.  This continues the Court’s trend of being less willing to intervene 
when it sees the “reasonableness” threshold to be lower as a result of the lower 
associated punishments from conviction.  Furthermore, by nature of the minor 
incarcerative results of misdemeanor charges, the Supreme Court has had only 
very brief opportunities to address adequacy of counsel for misdemeanants.  
	
 43 See infra Part I.D for more on the right to counsel in peripheral criminal defense processes. 
 44 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366 (2010). 
 45 See id. at 366–67 (citing to the ABA, National Legal Aid and Defender Association, the Department 
of Justice’s Compendium of Standards for Indigent Defense Systems, and other determinants of 
professional norms); see also infra Part I.E. 
 46 United States v. Mooney, 497 F.3d 397, 404, 409 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 47 Riggs v. Fairman, 399 F.3d 1179, 1183–84 (9th Cir.), reh’g en banc granted, 430 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 
2005), appeal dismissed on other grounds, No. 02-55185, 2006 WL 6903784 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 48 Id. at 1183. 
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However, Gideon definitively still applies to misdemeanor sentences,49 and cases 
challenging the effectiveness of counsel for misdemeanors still receive the Strick-
land two-prong analysis.50  Therefore, while some degree of protection still exists 
under the right to effective counsel, the boundaries lack any tangible specific 
guidance relative to those that risk more severe punishment. 
The Court has only addressed effective counsel claims for misdemeanor 
charges on two occasions.  In Argersinger, the Supreme Court noted that the 
right to counsel applies to any criminal case that involves a defendant facing 
incarceration, even if for a misdemeanor.51  In Shelton, the Court confirmed 
that Argersinger attaches the right to counsel to all cases involving criminal 
detention, even if that detention is conditional or prospective.52 
Without any specification that would limit Strickland to cases decided on 
felony counts, it appears that the same duties of reasonable counsel extend 
to misdemeanor cases as well.  What is unclear, however, is the extent of the 
obligation.  For example, the Fourth Circuit in Mooney upheld a duty to in-
vestigate an affirmative defense to a felony charge of a previously convicted 
felon possessing a firearm.53  There, the court held that Mooney’s attorney 
had a duty to investigate the justification that Mooney had seized the firearm 
from his ex-wife as she was attacking him with it only for him to surrender it 
to the police.54  While the duty to investigate affirmative defenses reached 
that far in the case of a felony charge, there is likely a duty to investigate to 
only a lesser extent for a simple misdemeanor charge.  Prevailing professional 
norms, of course, are key in determining how much time, effort, and persis-
tence a defense attorney would need to expend in searching for potential de-
fenses—a threshold affirming that misdemeanors have lower reasonableness 
requirements for defense attorneys.55 
D.  Effective Counsel Outside the Courtroom 
In two of the Court’s landmark cases, the Court expanded the right to 
counsel beyond simply investigation and courtroom advocacy.  In Padilla v. 
Kentucky and Missouri v. Frye, the majorities recognized the pragmatic needs of 
	
 49 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 32 (1972) (noting that the decision in Gideon suggests certain 
fundamental rights apply to all criminal prosecutions “where an accused is deprived of his liberty”). 
 50 See Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 314 n.157 (2011) (listing federal circuit and district court applications of 
the Strickland test to misdemeanor charges). 
 51 Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 32, 37. 
 52 Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 662 (2002). 
 53 United States v. Mooney, 497 F.3d 397, 404 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 54 Id. at 399, 404. 
 55 As discussed in Part I.E, professional guidance suggests that investigation into misdemeanors does 
not have to be as searching as in felony cases. 
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reasonably effective counsel require attorneys to provide some outside advisory 
and consulting duties in key steps in the criminal defense process.56 
When a collateral consequence is so severe as to blur the lines between 
collateral and direct punishment, counsel has an obligation to advise his cli-
ent about the potential or mandatory results of a guilty plea.  One of the most 
important modern cases in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence is Padilla, in 
which the Court found inadequate representation when the attorney failed 
to warn his client that a conviction would necessarily mean deportation.57  
Although the Court refused to determine whether the deportation was a di-
rect or a collateral consequence of conviction,58 the formal distinction be-
tween the two suggests that it would apply as a collateral consequence.59  Re-
gardless, Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, eventually concluded that 
the punishment of automatic deportation was so significant that a reasonable 
attorney would have to advise his client of the mandatory outcome of a guilty 
plea.60  Anything less than clear advice, in the case of an explicit and clear 
mandate for deportation, is a “deficiency” in counsel of Strickland propor-
tions.61  The Court, therefore, requires counsel to advise their clients on se-
vere collateral legal consequences of a guilty plea.62 
When some aspect of the litigation process, inside or outside the courtroom, 
is essential to the judicial system, the Sixth Amendment requires counsel to 
communicate about it with his client.  In Frye, the Court continued to hold that 
an accused felon’s right to counsel can apply to essential litigation steps outside 
the courtroom.63  Frye’s attorney failed to respond to plea deals or pass the offers 
on to the defendant before they expired.64  Upon eventual appeal, Frye success-
fully argued that a failure to pass the plea bargains on prejudiced the entire 
process and constituted a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights.65  The Court 
agreed that an attorney has a duty to pass plea offers on to his client as a natural 
function of the plea bargain’s “central” role in the administration of justice.66 
	
 56 Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012); Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366 (2010). 
 57 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 359, 374. 
 58 Id. at 366. 
 59 Collateral consequences take effect through civil enforcement, not as a direct criminal punishment. 
See INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT, supra note 5. 
 60 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 368–69. 
 61 Id. at 369. 
 62 Because the Court refused to recognize Padilla as a retroactive right, there have been very few op-
portunities to apply it to habeas proceedings in federal court in the few years since Padilla was 
handed down.  See Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1107 (2013) (holding Padilla is a non-
retroactive rule).  However, the potential exploration under Padilla is likely to fill in several of the 
gaps left in how to effectuate the precedent.. 
 63 See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012) (stating that the Sixth Amendment applies to the 
plea bargain process). 
 64 Id. at 138–39.  
 65 Id. at 139–40.  
 66 Id. at 143.  
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Per the Court’s dual precedents of Padilla and Frye, effective counsel is not 
limited to activity inside the courtroom or to a duty to investigate.  Instead, 
defense representation must provide effective counsel at all central steps of 
the criminal defense process, including learning about and understanding the 
possible implications of some collateral consequences that a guilty verdict or 
plea could trigger. 
E.  Role of ABA Guidance 
Most compellingly demonstrating the Court’s application of a sliding scale 
is the Court’s reliance on professional standards, which show different expec-
tations for attorney action based on the severity of the charge.  In her article 
examining Strickland’s standards for misdemeanants, Professor Jenny Roberts 
discusses the expectations for counsel’s level of care in criminal defense: 
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s emphatic reliance on professional stand-
ards in recent ineffective assistance jurisprudence, an institutional defender 
office or an attorney new to criminal practice might reasonably turn to pub-
lished professional standards for guidance on representation in misdemeanor 
cases.  That attorney will find different defender caseload recommendations 
for felonies and misdemeanors.  That attorney may also find different levels 
of compensation for felony and misdemeanor representation in her jurisdic-
tion, which suggests different expectations for felony and misdemeanor rep-
resentation.67 
For example, the American Bar Association has adopted the guidelines of 
the National Advisory Commission (“NAC”) on Criminal Justice Standards 
and Goals for attorney caseload maximums.68  The NAC standards recom-
mend no more than 150 felony defense cases per attorney per year, but con-
cedes a higher total of 400 as a cap for misdemeanor defense cases.69  Profes-
sor Roberts also indicates the heightened pay grade for felony defense 
attorneys than their misdemeanor counterparts,70 while felony and capital 
defense attorneys typically also have a higher degree of expertise as well.71 
	
 67 Roberts, supra note 50, at 326–27 (footnotes omitted). 
 68 See TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM 4 n.2, 5 n.19 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002) 
[hereinafter ABA TEN PRINCIPLES] (indicating conformance with NAC Standard 13.12, including 
a maximum attorney caseload recommendation of 150 felonies per year or 400 misdemeanors per 
year). 
 69 Id. at 5 n.19. 
 70 Roberts, supra note 50, at 326–27, 327 n.214. 
 71 See id. at 363 (noting that the ABA’s Ten Principles imply “that there are certain classes of cases that 
require a certain level of experience and expertise,” such as “cases that carry significant potential 
prison—or death—sentences”).  Generally, public defenders start on misdemeanor cases before work-
ing their way up to felony defense and then possibly to capital defense.  See id. at 303, 305, 364 (re-
marking that “new attorneys” often begin their practice with misdemeanor cases); see also id. at 326–27 
(explaining that a new attorney might “reasonably turn to published professional standards for guid-
ance” and that when she does, she will find different recommendations based on the level of offense). 
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The Court widely cites the ABA and other professional organizations as 
useful guides to determine prevailing professional norms.72  However, the 
Court has fluctuated on the extent of its reliance on the ABA as a promulga-
tor of professional norms—ranging from using ABA guidelines as the “stand-
ards for capital defense work”73 to “guides . . . [but] they are only guides.”74  
Exactly how definitive ABA guidelines are remains unclear, since full defer-
ence to the ABA would allow the organization the ability to define constitu-
tional norms without oversight.75  Nonetheless, the Court continues to refer-
ence them as an essential benchmark in how reasonably attorneys must act. 
Professor Roberts cites to the Court’s reliance on the ABA’s and other 
professional organizations’ guidelines as evidence that attorneys’ duties in 
service of criminal defendants must rise and fall proportionately to the level 
of punishment for the accused crime.76  Her interpretation of the Court’s 
sliding scale accords with the model examined above—higher punishment 
crimes require more care, effort, and counsel from defense attorneys. 
Most consequentially, the Court itself referenced the amount of harm as 
applicable to Strickland’s requirement of reasonable assistance of counsel.  In 
demurring from defining a clear rule of whether direct or indirect punish-
ments can influence the requirements of Strickland, the Padilla Court noted that 
the extent of punishment is vital to “define the scope of constitutionally ‘rea-
sonable professional assistance’ required under Strickland.”77  By accepting the 
extent of punishment as a definitive factor in the requirements of the right to 
counsel, the Court implicitly adopted Professor Roberts’ analysis, and by ex-
tension the analysis above, to adopt Strickland as an adaptive requirement. 
II.  CLIENT-SPECIFICITY—EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF  
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES 
“When the deprivation of property rights and interests is of sufficient 
consequence, denying the assistance of counsel . . . is a denial of due process.”78  
Justice Powell, in his concurrence in Argersinger, noted the interplay between 
	
 72 See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 367 (2010) (citing the National Legal Aid and Defender 
Association, Department of Justice, and journal and treatise guidelines for effective aid). 
 73 Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003). 
 74 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). 
 75 See id. at 688–89 (stating that a “particular set of detailed rules for counsel’s conduct . . . would 
interfere with the constitutionally protected independence of counsel”). 
 76 See Roberts, supra note 50, at 326–27 (observing that there are “different expectations for felony and 
misdemeanor representation” under current professional guidelines); supra text accompanying note 
67 (stating the same); see also ABA TEN PRINCIPLES, supra note 68, at 5 n.19 (noting that an attorney 
may take on at the most 400 misdemeanors and 150 felonies per year). 
 77 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 365 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). 
 78 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 48 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring in the result) (emphasis added) 
(footnote omitted). 
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collateral consequences and the variable requirements of Strickland.79  Greater 
punitive harms, whether direct or collateral, require greater obligations of 
defense counsel. 
The right to effective counsel should mandate that defense attorneys dis-
cuss the possible implications of collateral consequences with their clients.  
This requirement stems from Padilla’s required consideration of all punitive 
harms, not merely incarcerative ones,80 as well as Frye’s rule that the Sixth 
Amendment covers vital stages of defense even outside the courtroom.81  
While the exact extent of the right to effective counsel may vary along with 
the amount of punishment, a defense attorney must assess (1) the applicability 
of the collateral consequences to the client and (2) the client’s comparative 
interests in avoiding incarcerative or non-incarcerative punishments.  Only 
after this conversation can an attorney assess the level of punishment and 
provide the appropriate Strickland level effective assistance. 
To demonstrate this conclusion, we must first recognize that, in terms of 
Strickland’s sliding scale, misdemeanors with significant collateral harms merit 
more in-depth care than previous analysis has suggested.  Padilla states that 
the consideration of additional, collateral harms affects the total harm of a 
conviction and therefore increases the amount of care a reasonably effective 
attorney would provide.82  But, buried in Padilla, there is a second step: some 
implicit analysis of the nature of the collateral consequence—whether puni-
tive or pragmatic—that may prove a useful distinction for courts in deter-
mining Padilla’s effect on Strickland.83  Following the second step, effective 
counsel must, at the very least, discuss and be prepared to weigh the effects 
of punitive collateral consequences as they apply to the client, whether on 
felony or misdemeanor charges. 
A.  Which Consequences Should Attorneys Consider? 
One of the many monumental pillars created by Padilla is the majority’s 
discussion of collateral consequences.  Justice Stevens’s majority addressed 
automatic deportation, though not a criminal punishment in the historic 
Sixth Amendment context of incarceration, as “uniquely difficult to classify 
as either a direct or a collateral consequence.”84  Although the Court did not 
ultimately address the larger world of collateral consequences, the ruling did 
	
 79 Id.; see also id. at n.11 (listing several collateral consequences as included in “property rights and 
interests”). 
 80  See infra Part II.A.1. 
 81  See supra Part I.D. 
	82 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 364–65, 373.  
 83  See id. at 365–66 (explaining that though deportation proceedings are civil, deportation is a penalty 
closely tied to criminal conviction).  
 84 Id. at 360, 366. 
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establish that punitive actions are an integral part of Strickland’s effective 
counsel analysis.85  Justice Alito, in concurrence, suggested similar conse-
quences that would merit additional scrutiny under the Padilla standard, al-
beit while rejecting large portions of Stevens’ opinion.86  Among these com-
parable collateral consequences, Justice Alito included “civil commitment, 
civil forfeiture, the loss of the right to vote, disqualification from public ben-
efits, ineligibility to possess firearms, dishonorable discharge from the Armed 
Forces, and loss of business or professional licenses.”87  In doing so, Justice 
Alito recognized the implications of Padilla, if unchecked, could reach further 
than merely the narrowest reading in deportation cases.  However, Justice 
Alito’s concurrence also raised a significant question in collateral conse-
quence defense: Which collateral consequences should Strickland factor in? 
1.  Punitive Versus Pragmatic Collateral Consequences 
Padilla recognized deportation as something a defense attorney must dis-
cuss with the defendant because of deportation’s punitive nature.88  Justice 
Stevens, in writing the opinion, explicitly refused to state whether direct and 
collateral forms of punishment merit equal consideration in the Strickland 
analysis.89  However, he nonetheless included deportation as a relevant harm 
to the defendant because the American legal system has “long recognized 
that deportation is a particularly severe ‘penalty.’”90  The Court adopted de-
portation harms as relevant to reasonable assistance of counsel because, alt-
hough “it is not, in a strict sense, a criminal sanction,” convicted noncitizens 
see deportation as a punitive outcome.91  In subsequently discussing this di-
vide, the Court has stated that “the severity of the penalty and the ‘automatic’ 
way it follows from conviction” are the relevant factors to whether the con-
sequences merit Strickland scrutiny.92 
The Court therefore relies on a distinction within the broad scope of col-
lateral consequences—those which have punitive outcomes versus those 
which exist for social protection.  Although not always a clear line, many 
	
 85 Id. at 365–66, 369.  Stevens suggests that a punitive intent, rather than mere pragmatic concerns, 
may be a distinctive consideration for when a collateral consequence is relevant to a Strickland anal-
ysis.  Id. at 365–66 (explaining that deportation merits special scrutiny “because of its close connec-
tion to the criminal process”). 
 86 Id. at 375–77 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 87 Id. at 376.  
 88 Id. at 365, 374 (majority opinion) (discussing deportation as “a particularly severe ‘penalty’” (quot-
ing Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 740 (1893))). 
 89 Id. at 365. 
 90 Id. at 365–66 (quoting Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 740). 
 91 Id. 
 92 Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1111–12 (2013) (quoting Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366) (re-
jecting that Padilla stood for a complete eradication of the “direct-collateral” distinction). 
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collateral consequences can be seen as promulgated for one of these two pur-
poses, and therefore they apply to a different extent in a Strickland analysis. 
Deportation, for example, is one of the most obvious examples of a puni-
tive consequence.  The goal of instituting automatic or discretionary depor-
tation proceedings for a noncitizen convict is to deter crime.93  Criminal de-
portation generally falls into the deterrence theory of punishment because 
the enhanced punishment would scare potential criminals by sanctioning 
criminal action to a greater extent.94  On the other hand, criminal deporta-
tion serves little non-retributive purpose in protecting society.  Crime rates 
for noncitizens are significantly lower than those of citizens in the United 
States.95  Recidivism rates among noncitizens are lower than recidivism for 
U.S. citizens, so the threat to social safety by post-incarceration noncitizens 
is lower than that of citizens.96  Because of its punitive role, the Court factored 
deportation, a punitive collateral consequence, into the Strickland formula. 
Some collateral consequences grow instead from a social protection in-
terest.  A typical example is that sex offenders cannot work in public schools 
based on certain crimes.  Alaska has a mandatory ban on certifying teachers 
with previous sexual offense convictions involving a minor.97  Similar statutes 
exist in other jurisdictions, including California98 and Vermont,99 with par-
allels in some federal education programs as well.100  The purpose of statutes 
like these is clearly not a punitive one—there is little deterrent potential in 
prohibiting future employment at a public school relative to the much larger 
deterrent impacts of criminal sentences.  Collateral consequences like these 
	
 93 Anita Ortiz Maddali, Padilla v. Kentucky: A New Chapter in Supreme Court Jurisprudence on Whether 
Deportation Constitutes Punishment for Lawful Permanent Residents?, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 43 (2011).  
 94 Id. 
 95 Richard Pérez-Peña, Contrary to Trump’s Claims, Immigrants Are Less Likely to Commit Crimes, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/26/us/trump-illegal-immigrants-crime.html. 
 96 Peter H. Schuck, Immigrant Criminals in Overcrowded Prisons: Rethinking an Anachronistic Policy, 27 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 597, 600 n.12 (2013) (noting a 1995 study showing that recidivism for noncitizens was 
17.1% compared to 22.8% for U.S. citizens).  However, the effect of deportation on these data is unclear.  
 97 ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 14.20.020(f) (West 2017) (“The department may not issue a teacher certifi-
cate to a person who has been convicted of a crime . . . involving a minor under [sexual offense 
statutes] . . . .”). 
 98 If an employment applicant for a child-care position has a previous guilty or nolo contendere plea or 
conviction for a violent crime or sexual offense, the California state government must deny their ap-
plication.  While many crimes have some waiver potential, this waiver is prohibited for sexual offenses.  
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 101170(k)(1) (2017), WL 22 CCR § 101170(m) (citing CAL. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE § 1596.871(b) (West 2017)) (prohibiting waiver for sexual offense convictions). 
 99 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 255(i) (West 2017) (“A person convicted of a sex offense that requires 
registration . . . shall not be eligible for employment [in public or independent schools].”). 
 100 29 U.S.C. § 3195(b)(3) (2012) (barring any applicant for the Job Corps (a federal vocational training 
program) from approval if the mandatory background check shows a conviction for “child abuse, 
or a crime involving rape or sexual assault”). 
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fall into the bucket of utilitarian or social protection punishments—prag-
matic punishments that potentially or automatically preclude convicted 
criminals from high risk activities.  Other similar collateral consequences in-
clude bans on elected office from people previously convicted of bribery or 
crimes of moral turpitude101 or abridging firearm ownership rights for people 
convicted of violent felonies.102 
Collateral consequences of this pragmatic or social welfare nature may 
not fit into the Strickland scale because of Padilla’s inclusion of collateral con-
sequences posed as a penalty.  Justice Stevens’ opinion hinted that non-pu-
nitive collateral consequences are not factors in determining the required ex-
tent of reasonably effective counsel.103  Furthermore, Justice Alito’s concurrence 
listed pragmatic collateral consequences as an example of the Padilla major-
ity’s logic ad absurdum.104 
The harder questions arise when a collateral consequence doesn’t easily 
fit into either category—that of wholly punitive or wholly pragmatic.  An 
example might be the loss of access to welfare based on a criminal record,105 
which serves the dual purposes of further penalizing criminal conduct while 
also trying to cut down on the risk that public funds could be used inappro-
priately.  In addressing these questions, the Sixth Amendment would then 
require consideration only of the extent of a consequence’s punitive aspects.  
On the other hand, the non-punitive, social welfare aspects of the collateral 
consequence wouldn’t be pertinent to the Strickland analysis of what the Sixth 
Amendment requires.  Either way, to assess the punitive extent of a conse-
quence on a defendant, defense counsel must have a preliminary discussion 
with her client or risk providing inadequate assistance in violation of the de-
fendant’s constitutional rights. 
2.  Discretionary Versus Mandatory Collateral Consequences 
Padilla expanded the scope of Strickland obligations as they pertained to a 
client facing mandatory deportation.  The Court did not, however, discuss 
the obligations in light of mandatory or discretionary harms.  Instead, the 
discussion of the Court may suggest that Strickland considerations would be 
based on the amount of risk of the collateral harm, which would again treat the 
issue as a spectrum, with mandatory consequences at the 100% level of risk.  
	
 101 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 17-17-41 (West 2017) (barring a public official, once convicted of meddling 
in an election, from taking office as a result of that election). 
 102 See, e.g., id. § 13A-11-72(a) (prohibiting persons convicted of crimes of violence from legally obtaining 
or possessing a firearm). 
 103 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S 356, 364–66 (2010). 
 104 Id. at 376–77 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 105 See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 42-2-112(n) (West 2017) (denying welfare to individuals who do not 
comply with statutory requirements). 
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The Court’s subsequent discussion of Padilla in Chaidez confirms the im-
portance of the mandatory-discretionary distinction as a factor of considera-
tion in the Strickland framework. 
The closest Supreme Court discussion in Padilla to address mandatory 
versus discretionary punishments comes in Justice Stevens’ discussion about 
the risks of the attorney misreading the law on mandatory enforcement: 
There will, therefore, undoubtedly be numerous situations in which the de-
portation consequences of a particular plea are unclear or uncertain.  The 
duty of the private practitioner in such cases is more limited.  When the law 
is not succinct and straightforward . . . , a criminal defense attorney need do 
no more than advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may 
carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences.  But when the deportation 
consequence is truly clear, as it was in this case, the duty to give correct ad-
vice is equally clear.106 
In this excerpt, Justice Stevens discusses the risk that the law requires depor-
tation, in light of an individual attorney being unable to predict legal outcomes 
with precise foresight.107  Nonetheless, the text also describes the same balance 
of risk and harm that discretionary collateral consequences carry.  In this alter-
nate reading, “consequences” are still “unclear or uncertain”—not because the 
“law can be complex” but because discretionary outcomes cannot be pre-
dicted.108  When there is a risk of a punitive consequence, Stevens notes, there 
is an obligation to disclose the risk.109  And when there is a risk, the “possibility 
of [punishment] . . . will affect the scope and nature of counsel’s advice.”110 
However, the Court later reexamined the extent of Padilla in Chaidez, a 
case that noted that the “automatic” nature of the deportation in Padilla was 
a necessary component in the Court’s determination.111 
Given Padilla’s discussion of risk and Chaidez’s discussion of the automatic 
nature of deportation, the Court’s dividing line likely still accords with a 
model based on likely punitive harms, rather than a strict adherence to the 
mandatory-discretionary boundary. 
	
 106 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369 (majority opinion) (footnote omitted). 
 107 Id. at 369, 369 n.10 (referencing Justice Alito’s concurrence and his concern that the majority’s 
opinion would hold all criminal defense attorneys to the standard of specialists in immigration law 
and policy); see also id. at 387–88 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[A] criminal defense at-
torney should not be required to provide advice on immigration law, a complex specialty that gen-
erally lies outside the scope of a criminal defense attorney’s expertise.”). 
 108 Id. at 369 (majority opinion). 
	109 Id. 
 110 Id. at 369 n.10. 
 111 Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1112 (2013) (quoting Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366). 
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B.  Client-Specific Impacts and Priorities of Collateral Consequences 
Collateral consequences vary significantly between jurisdictions, and can 
touch on a broad array of aspects of a defendant’s life.  In Pennsylvania, for 
example, there are fifty different automatic collateral consequences that are 
triggered by various misdemeanor convictions, including forfeit of retirement 
benefits for public employees,112 loss of jury privileges,113 juvenile transfer to 
alternate education programs,114 ineligibility for public welfare until all terms 
served,115 and immediately having to leave public office.116  Any of these dif-
ferent consequences would affect defendants very differently based on the 
defendants’ personal circumstances. 
In analyzing the impact of collateral consequences, the Strickland standard 
requires consideration of the weight or effect of each of these harms on the 
individual defendant.  For example, although the threat of mandatory depor-
tation poses little concern to a natural-born U.S. citizen, the Court recognizes 
that “[p]reserving the [immigrant] client’s right to remain in the United States 
may be more important to the client than any potential jail sentence.”117 
At this point, it may be more helpful to discuss a hypothetical defend-
ant—George.  George is a noncitizen who lives in the United States, working 
as a taxi cab driver.  Although he works hard, George barely can support his 
family, who also lives in the U.S. with him in public housing.  One day, 
George is arrested and charged with several misdemeanor crimes—domestic 
abuse against his wife, followed by public intoxication and driving under the 
influence.  The alleged events also contain elements of sexual assault.  Assert-
ing his Sixth Amendment right to an attorney, George gets appointed coun-
sel—a local public defender named Rachel from a very busy office.  Rachel 
must vigorously advocate for George’s interests, but also she has hundreds, if 
not thousands, of other cases crossing her desk in any given year.  So what 
obligations does Rachel have to her client, George, under the Sixth Amend-
ment?  The Strickland scale would be informative, but only once we know the 
true extent of punishment George faces. 
This leads Rachel to two key steps—though they don’t need to be per-
formed in any specific order.  One, after seeing the charges brought forth by 
the prosecution, Rachel should look at the related collateral consequences that 
	
 112 43 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1313(a) (West 2017). 
 113 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4502(a) (West 2017). 
 114 24 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 21-2134(a), (d) (West 2017). 
 115 62 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 432(9) (West 2017). 
 116 65 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 121 (West 2017). 
 117 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 368 (2010) (first alteration in original) (quoting Immigration & 
Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 322 (2001), superseded by statute, REAL ID Act of 2005, 
Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302). 
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can harm her client.118  Here the charges are misdemeanors, but they poten-
tially include domestic abuse.  As Rachel is aware, a noncitizen who pleads 
guilty to or is convicted of a domestic abuse charge is subject to automatic de-
portation.119  For his DUI charge, George could lose his taxi license.120  For 
any of these crimes, George could lose his eligibility for public housing.121 
Other collateral consequences may also apply, based on George’s history 
and specific circumstances.  This gives rise to Rachel’s other step—to ade-
quately provide for George’s representation, Rachel needs to have a discus-
sion with him regarding both the applicability of collateral consequences to 
his life and his relative concerns between collateral and direct punishments.  
To be able to adequately advocate for her client, Rachel needs to know what 
her client most wants to avoid.  Anything less would risk subjecting her client 
to a significant punishment that lies against his interests.  Here, George may 
be willing to plead guilty to the two alcohol-related crimes to avoid the auto-
matic deportation aspects of the domestic violence charge.  Depending on 
his attachment to his job, he may be more willing to risk deportation by going 
to trial unless he can also plead around the DUI.  But all of this is subject to 
both George’s individual history and personal preferences.  His attorney 
needs to know these things to be able to represent his interests. 
Further enforcing the need to have this conversation is the logic underlying 
Padilla—that counsel has a responsibility to tell her client about significant pu-
nitive collateral risks122—and that of Frye—that the Sixth Amendment includes 
non-litigation obligations that are central to the criminal justice system.123 
Finally, these discussions with George are essential because they allow 
Rachel to understand exactly how much a reasonable attorney should do to 
protect her client.  If Rachel was unaware of George’s backstory,124 as perti-
nent to collateral consequences, she might only prioritize her time such that 
	
 118 A single jurisdiction can have immense numbers of collateral consequences for various crimes, some 
mandatory and some discretionary.  Without an independent entity turning these into a single da-
tabase, the demand on Rachel’s time to research this could threaten to drown her.  Fortunately, 
the Department of Justice has already funded the creation of this database under the Council of 
State Governments’ Justice Center.  See Nat’l Inventory Collateral Consequences Conviction, JUST. CTR., 
COUNCIL ST. GOV’TS, https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org (last visited Jan. 10, 2018). 
 119 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E) (2012). 
 120 See, e.g., 52 PA. CODE § 30.76(d)(3) (2017), WL 52 Pa. Code § 30.76 (requiring mandatory loss of 
taxi driver certificate for drunk driving convictions if driving the taxi while under the influence). 
 121 42 U.S.C. § 13661(c) (2012) (allowing public housing officials discretionary authority to deny ad-
mission to convicted people who may threaten the health or safety of other residents). 
 122  See supra Part II.A.1. 
 123  See supra Part I.D. 
 124 This hypothetical does take advantage of over-simplification, of course.  In a real proceeding, even a 
time-strapped Public Defenders’ Office would likely note George’s citizenship status and profession 
in the most preliminary intake procedure.  However, these offices may not also include other perti-
nent information. See, e.g., Office of the Pub. Def., Northampton Cty. Gov’t, Public Defender Appli-
cation 1–2 (2018), https://www.northamptoncounty.org/PUBDEF/Documents/Application% 
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she represents him with an unconstitutionally low amount of her time.  While 
the loss of taxi driving permission likely wouldn’t contribute to the Strickland 
analysis because of its presumably pragmatic basis, the potential loss of public 
housing access might have some effect on Rachel’s obligations.  Once she 
knows that her client faces deportation, certainly, the increased punitive out-
come from the proceedings require her to advocate more vigorously along 
the Strickland standard.125  Based on this information, Rachel can opt how to 
negotiate a plea bargain or proceed to trial.  In a likely outcome, George may 
have to plead guilty to one or both of the alcohol-related charges, but doing 
so would allow him to stay in the United States, perhaps after only a fine and 
rehabilitation requirements. 
This hypothetical demonstrates the oversimplification in wholesale reli-
ance on the ABA maximums based on the felony/misdemeanor distinction.  
Under the minimal interpretation suggested by ABA standards, Rachel could 
ethically represent four hundred Georges in a year—an average of five hours 
per client in a two-thousand-hour work year.  In those five hours, Rachel 
must acquaint herself with the client, assess the accusations, perform reason-
able background investigations, receive and assess plea deals, and keep the 
client involved abreast of all vital stages of the litigation.  On the other hand, 
one of Rachel’s peers could handle four hundred alleged misdemeanants, all 
U.S. citizens in private housing and with job security unaffected by criminal 
records.  Each of these defendants would get the same average of five hours 
of attorney representation, regardless of the applicability of collateral conse-
quences, because they are all misdemeanants in the ABA guidelines. 
However, if we hypothesize that all four hundred of Rachel’s clients face 
automatic deportation if she cannot find the time to vigorously defend their 
rights—adequately learn the facts of their case, realize that the defendants 
face this form of punitive harm, create a plea-bargaining strategy to avoid 
mandatory deportation, and leverage this preparation in negotiations with 
the prosecution—they will each face deportation.  As a matter of ethical con-
cern, “reasonable professional assistance” should be a more demanding con-
stitutional baseline when the nature of the harm contains the kind of punitive 
collateral consequences that Padilla addresses. 
Based on the Court’s evolving discussion on the right to counsel and the 
impact of collateral consequences, assessing the punitive effect of collateral 
consequences on the client is a constitutional obligation both for determining 
the client’s needs in the proceedings and for assessing the constitutional floor 
of adequacy of counsel.  These professional obligations derive not only from 
	
20for%20Public%20Defender.pdf.  While a cursory review could take the place of the first step 
described above, counsel must still have a discussion regarding the risks and priorities that the de-
fendant needs personally. 
 125  See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
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an ethical obligation to adequately represent one’s clients, but also from the 
reasonableness requirements of Strickland and the more holistic advocacy in-
terpretations of Padilla and Frye. 
III.  TANGIBLE REQUIREMENTS OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
Because of the varying effects of collateral consequences on defendants, 
defense counsel must discuss possibly applicable punitive consequences with 
the client to ascertain (1) the risks to the client of a conviction or guilty plea 
and (2) the client’s relative concerns in facing incarcerative or non-incarcer-
ative punishments.  Only after this conversation can an attorney be sure to 
provide the client with sufficient representation under the Sixth Amend-
ment’s requirements and ensure that she advocates the client’s true interests. 
A.  Relative Importance of Collateral Consequences—A “Reverse” Strickland Sliding 
Scale? 
The above requirements may not apply in the most highly punitive cases, 
since these conversations are only applicable in assessing significant impacts 
of collateral consequences on the total amount of punishment.  Despite the 
importance of determining a baseline of sufficient representation, the prag-
matic requirements of defining effective assistance may include the reality that 
higher levels of incarcerative punishments would mean that collateral conse-
quences wouldn’t make a significant impact on the needs of Strickland advo-
cacy.  Put this into the most far-reaching example: A client facing the death 
penalty wouldn’t want his attorney to be preoccupied by whether he might 
lose the ability to run for local government office someday.  Applying this 
“reverse sliding scale” analysis is a logical offshoot of both the need of the 
attorney to consider the relative harms of punishments as well as the reality 
that higher-level crimes already merit more rigorous defense representation 
than misdemeanor defense. 
While the Strickland sliding scale appears to suggest that attorneys must put 
more effort to defend their felony or capital case clients, the effect of collateral 
consequences on effective counsel’s requirements may actually decrease relative 
to the level of criminality.  As a result, the pragmatic consideration of collat-
eral consequences may only make an impact on criminal representation in 
misdemeanor cases or, in extreme circumstances, some felony charges. 
Throughout effective counsel jurisprudence, courts reference back to rea-
sonableness and prevailing professional standards.126  In the Strickland sliding 
scale model, pragmatism and reasonableness define the requirements of at-
torney actions.  In the case of significant incarcerative punishments, the result 
	
126  See supra Part I.C. 
784 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 20:3 
may be a reasonable presumption that collateral consequences will not be 
significant factors in the defendant’s decision-making process.  This accords 
with Frye’s determination that ineffective counsel claims can also be upheld 
even when a defendant is removed from the “central” stages of prosecu-
tion127—when comparing minor collateral consequences to major incarcer-
ative terms, pleading around minor potential collateral consequences cer-
tainly can become non-central to the proceedings. 
Considering the potential implications of this theory, it would mean that 
there are constitutional requirements under Strickland that would impact mis-
demeanor cases and some lesser felony cases without as much impact at the 
highest levels of criminality.  In Padilla, the Court affirmed the need to discuss 
collateral consequences in a felony drug distribution case with one of the 
most significant consequences—mandatory deportation.128  The presump-
tive relevance of collateral consequences might decrease in felony cases, 
where the direct punishments are generally far more significant.  In felony 
cases, therefore, it would make sense that a defense attorney may only need 
to perform cursory examinations of potential collateral consequences to focus 
exclusively on the harshest collateral effects.  Put simply—losing a driver’s 
license is probably not as an important of a concern for someone facing a life 
sentence as it would be for someone facing parole. 
In a misdemeanor, however, the presumptive relative importance of col-
lateral consequences is much higher, as a single guilty plea can affect thou-
sands of collateral consequences while risking only a few days in jail.  This 
would mean that examination of potential collateral consequences would 
have to be much more searching than in the field of felony defense, since the 
relative importance of minor collateral consequences is higher. 
The issue of defining a “presumptive” relative interest is a potentially 
thorny matter.  When can the court system or an attorney presume to know 
that any reasonable client would be more concerned about incarceration 
than threats to access to government benefits?  To housing?  To child cus-
tody? Complicating matters further is the prospective applicability of many 
collateral consequences—how can this formula consider a misdemeanant’s 
hopes of future political aspirations? 
Given the Court’s history of deference to attorney discretion, it is possible 
that this standard would be a highly pro-attorney one.  On the other hand, 
the Court may opt to hold information-sharing to a high standard, given the 
high interests of a criminal defendant in being able to rely on her attorney to 
advocate for their interests vigorously.  After all, the defendant’s liberty is at 
risk, and the attorney has a professional and constitutional obligation to ad-
vise her client of central litigative steps. 
	
 127 Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143, 145 (2012). 
 128 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 368–69 (2010). 
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Without more guidance by the Court on these matters, it is unclear whether 
there would be a pro-defendant or pro-attorney presumption; indeed, whether 
there could be a presumption at all is another issue never addressed by the Su-
preme Court’s supervision.  But the existence of a presumption is likely both as 
a pragmatic limitation on the obligations of counsel and as a realistic under-
standing of what criminal defendants want their attorneys to focus on. 
B.  What Does Effective Collateral Consequence Counseling Look Like in Practice? 
Just as the Court has given little direct guidance on the standards of Frye 
and Padilla in collateral consequence advocacy, there is little to no guidance 
on how to actually advise clients on collateral consequences.  Certainly the 
Constitution wouldn’t require overworked public defenders to talk through 
every potential collateral consequence with every defendant who gets pushed 
through their doors.  Instead, we once again can consider pragmatic needs 
and functional realities to determine how Strickland manifests in the realm of 
collateral consequence advocacy.  As previously noted, “reasonable” advo-
cacy may be subject to some limiting principle of presmptive importance, 
based on factors like potential harms and likelihood of applicability.  Some 
collateral harms are more likely applicable than others—a criminal defend-
ant is more likely to be concerned about access to government benefits like 
housing or welfare than the ability to form a nonprofit livestock co-op. 
Some of these most general issues can be addressed by a simple intake 
questionnaire, asking about clients’ need for government benefits, pending 
child custody issues, or plans to use government loans for education, for ex-
ample.  This model is currently being explored by the San Francisco Public 
Defender’s Office, examining the usefulness of questionnaires in several areas 
of criminal defense.129  Among these questionnaires, the San Francisco Public 
Defender’s Office has released examples of questionnaires to ensure end-to-
end client testimony preparation, establish evidence chains-of-custody, or 
clarify eyewitness records.130  While the office has not published an intake 
questionnaire, the office advocates checklists for some of the same reasons that 
one would benefit from collateral consequence awareness—enhanced thor-
oughness, reliability, and efficiency. 
Recall, however, that collateral consequences could introduce two re-
quirements on effective advocacy—the representing attorney must ascertain 
(1) the risks to the client of a conviction or guilty plea and (2) the client’s 
relative concerns in facing incarcerative or non-incarcerative punishments.  
While an intake questionnaire consisting of a simple series of checkboxes 
might constitute a reasonable investigation into the first prong (along with 
	
 129 See generally Jeff Adachi, Using Checklists to Improve Case Outcomes, CHAMPION, Jan.–Feb. 2015, at 30. 
 130 Id. 
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the help of a collateral consequences database to determine applicability), the 
attorney would still be obliged to meet with the client to address relative con-
cerns about incarcerative and non-incarcerative punishments.  Additionally, 
Padilla and Frye still represent the requirements of counsel informing the cli-
ent of these potential risks when significantly impactful, a task that likely re-
quires some form of personal discussion. 
CONCLUSION 
Strickland represented the Supreme Court’s acknowledgement that fair 
criminal prosecution cannot take place without the effective assistance of de-
fense counsel.  As a constitutional principle, criminal defendants need effec-
tive attorneys to protect their rights from abuse by the prosecutorial side of 
criminal justice.  Although protections of the Sixth Amendment are slow to 
be recognized, the Court has nonetheless recognized that protections must be 
reasonable and commensurate with prevailing professional norms—resulting 
in the birth of a proportional defense measure in the Strickland sliding scale. 
The Strickland sliding scale faced significant changes after the Supreme 
Court’s rulings in Padilla and Frye, which suggested a significant pragmatic 
bend in the previous determinations of effective client representation.  
Among these impacts is the requirement that collateral consequences, when 
both punitive and sufficiently central to criminal defense proceedings, are 
factored into Strickland evaluations. 
Looking into these considerations, the bare minimum requirement of col-
lateral consequence advocacy is that attorneys take the time to ascertain the 
potential application of these harms to their clients, as well as the client’s 
relative concerns about incarcerative versus collateral punishments.  Without 
significant further guidance by the Court, it is hard to understand more of 
what this model might require, but it is clear that effective counsel requires, 
at the very least, attorneys who are sufficiently informed of the potential pu-
nitive minefield of collateral consequences in defending their clients. 
 
 
